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While most hospitals are designed to control the spread of
infection, this was not always the case. During the evolution
of health care, most patients were cared for outside the
hospital, and only the poor and disadvantaged received
inpatient treatment. For most hospitals, care of the sick
became difficult or unwanted. For example, when the statutes
of the hospital of St. John, Bridgewater, were developed in
1219, Bishop Joscelin of Bath and Wells commented that “No
lepers, lunatics, or persons having the falling sickness or
other contagious disease, and no pregnant women or sucking
infants, and no intolerable persons, even though they be poor
and infirm, are to be admitted in the house; and if any such be
admitted by mistake, they are to be expelled as soon as
possible” (1). There are many similar cases of medieval
English hospitals where admittance of sick persons was
discouraged (2).
Puerperal Fever
The delivery of babies in hospital is a relatively recent
phenomenon: it evolved during the last half of the 20th
century. Before then, maternity hospitals were not considered
safe because of relatively high rates of death. It was not until
the observations of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Ignaz
Semmelweis that puerperal fever was thought to be a
communicable disease transmitted from health-care workers
to patients.
Semmelweis hypothesized that puerperal fever was
spread by the hands of physicians and midwives. He noted
that at the Vienna Lying-In Hospital the death rate was
almost 10% for women who delivered in Division I, compared
with 3% for women in Division II (3). Semmelweis’
investigation determined that food, water, ventilation, or
socioeconomic class did not account for these discrepancies.
However, he observed that patients with prolonged labor were
at increased risk and children born to infected mothers were
also more likely to become ill. Conversely, women whose
babies were born outside the hospital were less likely to
develop fever. Semmelweis also noted that infection in
Division I occurred sporadically and in clusters, whereas in
Division II, no clustering occurred.
His analysis revealed that medical students, who were
responsible for deliveries in Division I, often performed
autopsies before assisting in deliveries, while midwives, who
worked in Division II, did not. He theorized that disinfecting
hands could prevent transmission of infection from a diseased
cadaver to a pregnant patient (3). Therefore, on May 15, 1847,
he required all medical students to wash their hands with
chlorinated lime before assisting in deliveries, which resulted
in a dramatic outcome (Figure).
Florence Nightingale
Florence Nightingale made many observations about
hospital design based on her experiences during the Crimean
War. Her ideas regarding a sanitary environment meant
rejecting the 18th-century concept of long hospital corridors.
She commented that double wards were objectionable on
every account primarily because they prevented nurses from
being able to assess all their patients at the same time (4). She
also observed that open windows interfered with the
ventilation of hospital wards and allowed air from the wards
to pass into the corridors. Nightingale believed that
respiratory secretions were potentially dangerous, especially
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among the sick. Therefore, she said that depriving patients of
appropriate ventilation “is nothing but manslaughter under
the garb of benevolence” (5). Finally, she believed the sick
should be isolated and that hospitals should be no more than
two stories high. It was her contention that taller buildings
interfered with sunlight and ventilation.
Johns Hopkins Hospital
In 1875, after a large donation from Johns Hopkins, plans
were developed to build a hospital in Baltimore, Maryland. Of
five construction plans, two were substantially influenced by
infection control. Norton Folsom, superintendent of Massa-
chusetts General Hospital, believed that the hospital should
be well ventilated and provide an isolation ward “for the
occasional case so contagious or unpleasantly smelly that it
cannot remain under the same roof with others” (6). A New
York physician, Stephen Smith, believed that contagious
patients should be separated from each other. In his plan,
Smith classified patients into one of four categories: acutely
contagious cases; uncomplicated infections and fever cases;
acute medical and surgical cases; and completely noninfec-
tious chronic disease cases. Further, he suggested that
properly separating patients, with appropriate ventilation,
was the most important facet of hospital planning.
Private Rooms
In 1920, Asa Bacon of Chicago’s Presbyterian Hospital
noted that hospitals are hotels for sick people. One
disgruntled patient commented to him following his
discharge, “When I return, put me in a closet rather than in
the ward!” (7). Bacon concluded that the most efficient
hospital would contain all private rooms. His vision included
a private toilet and lavatory in each room; a central kitchen
and serving station; central linen supply instead of linen
rooms on each floor; elimination of long corridors;
dumbwaiters direct from central supply rooms; and
pneumatic tubes to carry written requisitions. Bacon
proposed these innovations 80 years ago, and today we take
them for granted as integral to the modern medical center.
Aberdeen Royal Infirmary
The Royal Infirmary in Aberdeen, Scotland, was
specifically designed to prevent hospital-acquired infections
in the surgical unit (8). Based on the recommendations of the
Infirmary’s Department of Bacteriology, no room had more
than four beds, and 41% of the rooms were private or had only
one bed. In addition, 10 private rooms surrounding central
nurses’ station were designed for “intensive nursing care.” All
rooms were mechanically ventilated, and 75% of the air was
cleaned and then recirculated. The design also included an
ISPIN (isolation, pre- and postoperative care including
intensive nursing) unit with all private rooms placed between
the operating room and the wards. This allowed “clean”
surgeries to be separated from those with the potential of
infection.
Modern Design
To minimize the risk for infection in hospitalized
patients, infection control professionals should participate in
facility design from a building’s inception (9). This allows for
identifying potential infection control issues early and
provides an opportunity to design solutions prospectively.
Infection control professionals also play an important role in
educating architects, engineers, and construction workers
about potential infection control risks and appropriate
methods for reducing them. Because infection control
professionals are often the only personnel with a clinical
background working on the construction project, they need to
visit the construction site frequently and completely
understand the extent of the project. Because of the profound
implications of inadequate oversight by infection control
professionals, these expectations should be included in the
hospital building contract (10). In addition, if the policies and
procedures set forth by the infection control team are
consistently ignored, the institution should fine the
contractors.
As part of the planning process for constructing a new
facility, an infection control risk assessment should be
conducted to determine the potential risk for transmission of
microorganisms within the hospital. In general, the risks can
be classified as infections transmitted by air, water, or
environment. The association between construction and the
development of aspergillosis in immunocompromised pa-
tients has been known for decades (11), as has the association
of hospital-acquired legionellosis and potable water (12).
More recently, contamination of the hospital environment has
been associated with transmission of Clostridium difficile
(13), methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
(14), and vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) (15).
Preventing Aspergillosis
Aspergillus spp. are ubiquitous fungi, typically found in
soil, decaying vegetation, and dust. Aspergillus spores are
easily suspended in the air and survive for prolonged periods.
Because of their size, they are easily inhaled, which can lead
to invasive infection of both the upper and lower respiratory
tracts in a susceptible host.
Epidemiologic evidence clearly correlates hospital
acquisition of aspergillosis with Aspergillus spore counts (16).
Therefore, installation of HEPA filters is essential in
locations housing patients at high risk. While achieving a
spore-free environment is an admirable goal, minimal
concentrations of fungal spores in the environment are
considered safe. In our new hospital, Northwestern Memorial,
in Chicago, Illinois, the entire building is HEPA filtered
because of the increasing number of immunosuppressed
patients. Before opening the hospital, we performed air
sampling to ensure the efficacy of the HEPA filter system and
found that the composite fungal concentration and the
Aspergillus spp. spore count were consistent with a highly
filtered environment (Table).
Table. Indoor air quality at Northwestern Memorial Hospital
Composite fungal
   concentration Aspergillus spp.
Locationa       (CFU/m3)     (CFU/m3)
16W 5.7 0.7
15Eb, 15W 0.04 0.0
11Ec 0.0 0.0
MICU 0.7 0.0
SICU 1.4 0.0
Operating rooms 0.6 0.0
Lobby 1.0 0.3
aMICU = medical ICU; SICU = surgical ICU.
bBone marrow transplant unit.
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Prevention of aspergillosis is particularly important for
patients undergoing solid organ and bone marrow
transplantation. In bone marrow transplant units, the air
should be HEPA filtered with the air pressure in the room
positive in relation to the corridor. In addition, rooms should
be tightly sealed, especially around windows, and the air
exchange rate should be high (>15 per hour) (17).
Preventing Tuberculosis (TB)
Proper health-care facility design can prevent hospital
transmission of TB to patients and health-care workers.
Ultimately, the interventions necessary to prevent hospital
transmission of TB depend on the incidence of this disease in
the community and have been published in detail (18). The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends that
patients requiring isolation for TB be placed in a room with
negative airflow. These rooms should have frequent air
exchanges (>12 per hour), and the air should be exhausted to
the outside without recirculation. Doors to the rooms should
be self-closing, and the walls, windows, ceiling, floor, and
penetrations well sealed. These rooms should be monitored to
ensure that they remain under negative pressure when
occupied by a TB patient.
Infection control professionals play a substantial role in
determining the appropriate location of negative-airflow
rooms when a hospital is being designed. Ideally, they should
be located in areas where patients at high risk will be cared for
(e.g., emergency department, recovery room, bronchoscopy
suite, ambulatory clinic, medical units).
Preventing Legionellosis
Legionella is an important cause of community- and
hospital-acquired lower respiratory tract infections. Person-
to-person transmission of this organism has not been
documented. Rather, infection is exclusively acquired from
the environment, and hospital acquisition is well recognized
(12,19,20). The most consistent observation about health-care
acquired legionellosis is its association with potable water.
The highest concentrations of the organism are found in hot-
water storage tanks, cooling towers, and condensers.
Effective methods for disinfecting the hospital water
supply include chlorination, thermal eradication, UV light,
and metal ionization (16). At our new medical center, we
elected to install a copper-silver ionization system. Despite
the potential presence of Legionella in the water supply,
routine culturing of water in the absence of proven or
suspected hospital transmission is not recommended (21).
Hospital Environment as a Risk for Infection
Hospital design should ensure that patients, especially
immunocompromised patients, are at no greater risk for
infection within the hospital than outside. Because the
microbial flora of a health-care facility can be influenced by its
design, infection control professionals play a major role in this
aspect.
Bacteria on hospital floors predominantly consist of skin
organisms, e.g., coagulase-negative staphylococci, Bacillus
spp., and diphtheroids (22); S. aureus and Clostridium spp.
can also be cultured. However, infection risk from
contaminated floors is small. Gram-negative bacteria are
rarely found on dry floors, but may be present after cleaning
or a spill. Nevertheless, these organisms tend to disappear as
the surface dries (23).
The survival of microbes on carpeting, however, is
different: they are present in larger numbers on this surface
and they pose a greater risk for infection. Therefore, carpets
should be vacuumed daily and periodically steam cleaned.
Carpeting should be avoided in high-risk areas because the
cleaning process may aerosolize fungal spores. Regardless of
the flooring chosen, it should be easily cleanable and water
resistant (9).
In general, pathogenic microorganisms do not readily
adhere to walls or ceilings unless the surface becomes moist,
sticky, or damaged (23). Little evidence exists that walls and
ceilings are a major source for hospital infection. Wall
coverings should be fluid resistant and easily cleaned,
especially in areas where contact with blood or body fluids
may occur (e.g., laboratories, operating rooms). Finishings
around plumbing fixtures should be smooth and water
resistant (9). In addition, pipe penetrations and joints should
be tightly sealed. Acoustical tiles should be avoided in high-
risk areas because they may support microbial growth when
wet. False ceilings may harbor dust and pests that may
contaminate the environment if disturbed, so should be
avoided in high-risk areas unless adequately sealed. Ideally,
walls and ceilings should have a smooth, impervious surface
that is easy to clean with minimal likelihood of dust
accumulation.
Infection control professionals are often consulted to
recommend appropriate finishes and fixtures. The best
finishes are durable and easy to clean. Surfaces that are
porous or textured may be difficult to clean and might
therefore harbor potentially pathogenic microbes (10).
Furniture is thought to be a minor infection risk, but
prolonged survival of VRE on chairs (24) and other
environmental surfaces has been documented (25). MRSA
and VRE have also been recovered from privacy curtains,
scrub suits, and plastic aprons (26); whether contamination of
these surfaces poses a risk to patients is unknown. However,
survival of these pathogens for even a short time increases the
possibility of their being acquired by patients or health-care
workers and spread from one person to the next.
Handwashing is the single most important method to
prevent hospital infections. Each patient room, examination
room, and procedure room needs at least one sink (9).
Optimally, it should be as close to the entrance of the room as
possible and be large enough to prevent splashing. Too
shallow a sink may cause contamination of hands by bacteria
residing in the drain; this was linked to a hospital outbreak of
multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacilli (27). Each sink
should be equipped with a hands-free control, soap dispenser,
and paper towel holder. Access to examination gloves and a
trash receptacle should be readily available. We installed a
dedicated sink at the entrance to every patient room to
facilitate handwashing by health-care workers.
Summary
The design of health-care facilities has undergone
substantial changes in large part because patients with
impaired host defenses now represent an increasing
proportion of hospitalizations. As a result, both design and
renovation of these facilities present unique challenges and
opportunities for infection control professionals, who are
often the only clinical staff associated with construction
projects. Early involvement in the process can make
appropriate communication easier and protect patient safety.357 Vol. 7, No. 2, March–April 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Ultimately, while time-consuming, participation in hospital
design, construction, and renovation can serve as another
marker of how infection control professionals improve the
quality of patient care.
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